Pragmatics
In the branch of
linguistics known as pragmatics, a presupposition (or PSP)
is an implicit assumption about
the world or background belief relating to an utterance whose truth is taken
for granted in discourse. Examples of
presuppositions include:
·
Jane no longer writes fiction.
o
Presupposition: Jane once wrote fiction.
·
Have you stopped eating meat?
o
Presupposition: you had once eaten meat.
·
Have you talked to Hans?
o
Presupposition: Hans exists.
A presupposition must
be mutually known or assumed by the speaker and addressee for the utterance to
be considered appropriate in context. It will generally remain a necessary
assumption whether the utterance is placed in the form of an assertion, denial,
or question, and can be associated with a specific lexical itemor grammatical feature
(presupposition trigger) in the utterance.
Crucially, negation of an expression does not change
its presuppositions: I want to do it again and I don't
want to do it again both presuppose that the subject has done it
already one or more times; My wife is pregnant and My
wife is not pregnant both presuppose that the subject has a wife. In
this respect, presupposition is distinguished from entailment and implicature. For example, The
president was assassinated entails that The president is dead,
but if the expression is negated, the entailment is
not necessarily true.
If presuppositions of
a sentence are not consistent with the actual state of affairs, then one of two
approaches can be taken. Given the sentences My wife is pregnant and My
wife is not pregnant when one has no wife, then either:
1.
Both the sentence and its negation are false; or
2.
Strawson's approach:
Both "my wife is pregnant" and "my wife is not pregnant"
use a wrong presupposition (i.e. that there exists a referent which can be described with the
noun phrase my wife) and therefore can not be assigned truth values.
Bertrand Russell tries to solve this
dilemma with two interpretations of the negated sentence:
1.
"There exists exactly one person, who is my wife and who is
not pregnant"
2.
"There does not exist exactly one person, who is my wife
and who is pregnant."
For the first phrase,
Russell would claim that it is false, whereas the second would be true
according to him.
Projection of presuppositions
A presupposition of a
part of an utterance is sometimes also a presupposition of the whole utterance,
and sometimes not. For instance, the phrase my wifetriggers the
presupposition that I have a wife. The first sentence below carries that
presupposition, even though the phrase occurs inside an embedded clause. In the second sentence, however, it
does not. John might be mistaken about his belief that I have a wife, or he
might be deliberately trying to misinform his audience, and this has an effect
on the meaning of the second sentence, but, perhaps surprisingly, not on the
first one.
1.
John thinks that my wife is beautiful.
2.
John said that my wife is beautiful.
Thus, this seems to be
a property of the main verbs of the sentences, think and say,
respectively. After work by Lauri Karttunen,[1] verbs that allow
presuppositions to "pass up" to the whole sentence ("project")
are called holes, and verbs that block such passing up, or projection of
presuppositions are called plugs. Some linguistic environments are
intermediate between plugs and holes: They block some presuppositions and allow
others to project. These are called filters. An example of such an
environment are indicative
conditionals ("If-then" clauses). A conditional
sentence contains an antecedent and a consequent.
The antecedent is the part preceded by the word "if," and the
consequent is the part that is (or could be) preceded by "then." If
the consequent contains a presupposition trigger, and the triggered
presupposition is explicitly stated in the antecedent of the conditional, then
the presupposition is blocked. Otherwise, it is allowed to project up to the
entire conditional. Here is an example:
If I have a
wife, then my wife is blonde.
Here, the
presupposition triggered by the expression my wife (that I
have a wife) is blocked, because it is stated in the antecedent of the
conditional: That sentence doesn't imply that I have a wife. In the following
example, it is not stated in the antecedent, so it is allowed to project, i.e.
the sentence does imply that I have a wife.
If it's already 4am,
then my wife is probably angry.
Hence, conditional
sentences act as filters for presuppositions that are
triggered by expressions in their consequent.
A significant amount
of current work in semantics and pragmatics is devoted to a proper
understanding of when and how presuppositions project.
A presupposition
trigger is a lexical item or linguistic construction which is responsible for
the presupposition, and thus "triggers" it.[2] The following is a selection of
presuppositional triggers following Stephen C. Levinson's
classic textbook on Pragmatics, which in turn draws on a list
produced by Lauri Karttunen.
As is customary, the presuppositional triggers themselves are italicized, and
the symbol » stands for 'presupposes'.[3]
Main article: Definite description
Definite descriptions
are phrases of the form "the X" where X is a noun phrase. The
description is said to be proper when the phrase applies to
exactly one object, and conversely, it is said to be improper when
either there exist more than one potential referents, as in "the senator
from Ohio", or none at all, as in "the king of France". In
conventional speech, definite descriptions are implicitly assumed to be proper,
hence such phrases trigger the presupposition that the referent is unique and
existent.
·
John saw the man with two heads.
»there exists a man with two heads.
»there exists a man with two heads.
See also: Epistemology § Truth
In Western
epistemology, there is a tradition originating with Plato of
defining knowledge as justified true belief. On this definition, for someone to
know X, it is required that X be true. A linguistic question thus arises
regarding the usage of such phrases: does a person who states "John knows
X" implicitly claim the truth of X? Steven Pinker explored this question in
a popular science format
in a 2007 book on language and cognition, using a widely publicized example
from a speech by a U.S. president.[4] A 2003 speech by George W. Bush
included the line, "British Intelligence has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."[5] Over the next few years, it
became apparent that this intelligence lead was incorrect. But the way the
speech was phrased, using a factive verb, implicitly framed the lead as truth
rather than hypothesis. There is however a strong alternative view that factivity
thesis, the proposition that relational predicates having to do with
knowledge, such as knows, learn, remembers, and realized,
presuppose the factual truth of their object, is incorrect.[6]
·
Martha regrets drinking John's home brew.
o Presupposition: Martha
did in fact drink John's home brew.
·
Frankenstein was aware that Dracula was there.
o Presupposition:
Dracula was in fact there.
·
John realized that he was in debt.
o Presupposition: John
was in fact in debt.
·
It was odd how proud he was.
o Presupposition: He was
in fact proud.
Some further factive
predicates: know; be sorry that; be proud that; be indifferent that; be
glad that; be sad that.
·
John managed to open the door.
»John tried to open the door.
»John tried to open the door.
·
John forgot to lock the door.
»John ought to have locked, or intended to lock, the door.
»John ought to have locked, or intended to lock, the door.
Some further
implicative predicates: X happened to V»X didn't plan or intend
to V; X avoided Ving»X was expected to, or usually did,
or ought to V, etc.
With these
presupposition triggers, the current unfolding situation is considered
presupposed information.[7]
·
John stopped teasing his wife.
»John had been teasing his wife.
»John had been teasing his wife.
·
Joan began teasing her husband.
»Joan hadn't been teasing her husband.
»Joan hadn't been teasing her husband.
Some further change of
state verbs: start; finish; carry on; cease; take (as in X
took Y from Z » Y was at/in/with Z); leave; enter; come; go;
arrive; etc.
These types of
triggers presuppose the existence of a previous state of affairs.[7]
·
The flying saucer came again.
»The flying saucer came before.
»The flying saucer came before.
·
You can't get gobstoppers anymore.
»You once could get gobstoppers.
»You once could get gobstoppers.
·
Carter returned to power.
»Carter held power before.
»Carter held power before.
Further
iteratives: another time; to come back; restore; repeat; for the nth
time.
Temporal clauses
The situation
explained in a clause that begins with a temporal clause constructor is
typically considered backgrounded information.[7]
·
Before Strawson was even born, Frege noticed presuppositions.
»Strawson was born.
»Strawson was born.
·
While Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics, the rest of
social science was asleep.
»Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics.
»Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics.
·
Since Churchill died, we've lacked a leader.
»Churchill died.
»Churchill died.
Further temporal
clause constructors: after; during; whenever; as (as in As
John was getting up, he slipped).
Cleft sentence
Cleft sentence
structures highlight particular aspects of a sentence and consider the
surrounding information to be backgrounded knowledge. These sentences are
typically not spoken to strangers, but rather to addressees who are aware of
the ongoing situation.[7]
·
Cleft construction: It was Henry that kissed Rosie.
»Someone kissed Rosie.
»Someone kissed Rosie.
·
Pseudo-cleft construction: What John lost was his wallet.
»John lost something.
»John lost something.
Comparisons and contrasts
Comparisons and
contrasts may be marked by stress (or by other prosodic means), by particles
like "too", or by comparatives constructions.
·
Marianne called Adolph a male chauvinist, and then HE insulted HER.
»For Marianne to call Adolph a male chauvinist would be to insult him.
»For Marianne to call Adolph a male chauvinist would be to insult him.
·
Carol is a better linguist than Barbara.
»Barbara is a linguist.
»Barbara is a linguist.
Counterfactual conditionals
·
If the notice had only said 'mine-field'
in Welsh as well as in English, we would never have
lost poor Llewellyn.
»The notice didn't say 'mine-field' in Welsh.
»The notice didn't say 'mine-field' in Welsh.
Questions
Questions often presuppose what the assertive part of the
question presupposes, but interrogative parts might introduce further
presuppositions. There are three different types of questions: yes/no
questions, alternative questions and WH-questions.
·
Is there a professor of linguistics at MIT?
»Either there is a professor of linguistics at MIT or there isn't.
»Either there is a professor of linguistics at MIT or there isn't.
·
Is Newcastle in England or in Australia?
»Newcastle is in England or Newcastle is in Australia.
»Newcastle is in England or Newcastle is in Australia.
·
Who is the professor of linguistics at MIT?
»Someone is the professor of linguistics at MIT.
»Someone is the professor of linguistics at MIT.
Possessive case
·
John's children are very noisy.
»John has children.
»John has children.
A presupposition of a
sentence must normally be part of the common ground of
the utterance context (the shared knowledge of the interlocutors)
in order for the sentence to be felicitous. Sometimes, however, sentences may
carry presuppositions that are not part of the common ground and nevertheless
be felicitous. For example, I can, upon being introduced to someone, out of the blue explain
that my wife is a dentist, this without my addressee having
ever heard, or having any reason to believe that I have a wife. In order to be
able to interpret my utterance, the addressee must assume that I have a wife.
This process of an addressee assuming that a presupposition is true, even in
the absence of explicit information that it is, is usually called presupposition
accommodation. We have just seen that presupposition triggers like my
wife (definite descriptions)
allow for such accommodation. In "Presupposition and Anaphora: Remarks on
the Formulation of the Projection Problem",[8] the philosopher Saul Kripke noted that some
presupposition triggers do not seem to permit such accommodation. An example of
that is the presupposition trigger too. This word triggers
the presupposition that, roughly, something parallel to what is stated has
happened. For example, if pronounced with emphasis on John, the
following sentence triggers the presupposition that somebody other than John
had dinner in New York last night.
John had dinner in New
York last night, too.
But that
presupposition, as stated, is completely trivial, given what we know about New
York. Several million people had dinner in New York last night, and that in
itself doesn't satisfy the presupposition of the sentence. What is needed for
the sentence to be felicitous is really that somebody relevant to the interlocutors
had dinner in New York last night, and that this has been mentioned in the
previous discourse, or that this information can be recovered from it.
Presupposition triggers that disallow accommodation are called anaphoric presupposition
triggers.
Presupposition in critical discourse analysis
Critical
discourse analysis (CDA) is a broad study belonging to not one
research category. It focuses on identifying presuppositions of an abstract
nature from varying perspectives. CDA is considered critical, not only in the
sense of being analytical, but also in the ideological sense.[9] Through the analysis of written
texts and verbal speech, Teun A. van Dijk (2003) says CDA studies
power imbalances existing in both the conversational and political spectrum.[9] With the purpose of first
identifying and then tackling inequality in society, van Dijk describes CDA as
a nonconformist piece of work.[9] One notable feature of
ideological presuppositions researched in CDA is a concept termed synthetic
personalisation.[citation needed]
